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Abstract. Since the first use of a p-adic method for counting points
of elliptic curves, by Satoh in 1999, several variants of his algorithm
have been proposed. In the current state, the AGM algorithm, proposed
by Mestre is thought to be the fastest in practice, and the algorithm
by Satoh–Skjernaa–Taguchi has the best asymptotic complexity but re-
quires precomputations. We present an amelioration of the SST algo-
rithm, borrowing ideas from the AGM. We make a precise comparison
between this modified SST algorithm and the AGM, thus demonstrating
that the former is faster by a significant factor, even for small crypto-
graphic sizes.
1 Introduction
In the design of an elliptic public key cryptosystem, parameter initialization is
a difficult task; it is required to count points of curves until one is found with
almost prime group order. In the early ages of elliptic curve cryptography, the
only way to achieve this was to use curves with special properties like having
complex multiplication by a small discriminant or being supersingular, though
taking random curves might be seen as the most secure. The first polynomial time
algorithm for point-counting was designed in 1985 by Schoof [11], but was not fast
enough to deal with cryptographical sizes. A decade of theoretical and practical
improvements by Atkin, Couveignes, Elkies, Lercier, Morain, Mu¨ller lead to a
situation where point-counting was efficiently feasible for cryptographical sizes
(see the survey [1] and the references therein). However, the cost of parameter
initialization remained high (in runtime and in complexity of programming)
compared to other systems like RSA or XTR. Situation changed in 1999 when
Satoh [8] proposed a new algorithm for counting points of elliptic curves over
finite field of small characteristic. His method is based on the computation of
the canonical lift of the curve in a p-adic local ring. The theoretical complexity
is asymptotic better than all the variants of Schoof’s algorithm. Further work
by Fouquet–Gaudry–Harley [2, 3], Skjernaa [12], Vercauteren et al. [13], Satoh–
Skjernaa–Taguchi [9, 10], Hae Young Kim et al. [7] made this algorithm practical,
in particular in characteristic 2, which is the most important in practice. Another
2closely related method, based on the algebraic-geometric mean (AGM) was found
by Mestre, and an implementation by Harley [5] proved it to be very efficient.
For a curve over F2n , the complexity of all these method is in O(n
3+ε), except
for the Satoh–Skjernaa–Taguchi (SST) method which achieves a complexity in
O(n2.5+ε) but requires precomputations.
In characteristic 2, with the current state of the art, AGM is thought to be
the fastest for cryptographical sizes, due to a very small constant, and is also the
best algorithm for computing records. The first drawback of the SST algorithm
is the precomputation stage which is not feasible for records, but this is not at all
a problem for cryptographical sizes, where this is easily doable and the storage
of the precomputed data is manageable. Another problem in the SST method
is that the defining polynomial for the local ring is dense, thus increasing the
cost of a multiplication by a factor of 3 compared to the sparse structure used
in AGM.
Our contribution is two-sided: firstly we mix ideas of SST and AGM to get
what we call the modified SST algorithm (MSST) which is faster by a constant
factor compared to the original SST algorithm. Our improvement modifies only
the lifting phase; the norm computation which is common to both algorithm is
not modified. Then we make a precise comparison between MSST and AGM
algorithms, based on an evaluation of the number of operations required at each
precision. This turns out to be in favor of MSST, even for small cryptographical
sizes, as confirmed by some experiments we did on a Pentium III: for curves over
F2163 we get a speed-up by a factor of 4.15 and for curves over F2239 the factor
is 4.90.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall some basics and fix
notations. In Section 3 and 4, we give a brief description of the original SST and
AGM algorithms. Section 5 is devoted to the mix of SST and AGM algorithms.
Section 6 contains a theoretical comparison between MSST and AGM methods,
and Section 7 contains the numerical experiments.
2 General Setting and Notations
Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic 2, and let n be such that q = 2
n. Let E
be a non-supersingular elliptic curve over Fq. For the purpose of point-counting,
without lost of generality, and perhaps considering the quadratic twist of E, we
can assume that E has an equation of the form y2 + xy = x3 + a6. Then its j-
invariant is given by j = a−16 . Denote by N the group order of E. The trace of E
is defined by Tr(E) = q+1−N and Hasse’s theorem states that |Tr(E)| ≤ 2√q.
All the p-adic point-counting methods proceed in the same way: lift some
data from Fq to a p-adic local ring with enough precision, and deduce a p-adic
approximation of the Tr(E) which might be enough to conclude due to Hasse’s
bound.
In our case, the 2-adic local ring we shall consider is the ring of integers of
the degree n unramified extension of Q2. In the following we denote this ring by
Zq (noted W (Fq) in some papers, or simply R in [10]). Note that Zq has nothing
3to do with Z/qZ, just like the ring of 2-adic integers Z2 is not Z/2Z. The ring
Zq is equipped with a cyclic Z2-automorphism of order n which reduces to the
2-nd power Frobenius automorphism of Fq.
We give a constructive way to see the ring Zq. Let f(t) be the irreducible
polynomial of degree n over F2 chosen to define Fq = F2[t]/(f(t)). Consider
any monic polynomial f(t) with coefficients in Z2 which reduces to f(t) mod-
ulo 2. Then f(t) is irreducible and Zq can be defined by Zq = Z2[t]/(f(t)).
Different choices for the polynomial f(t) lead to isomorphic rings. From an al-
gorithmic point of view two strategies can be used: choosing a sparse f(t) with
small coefficients speeds up the basic arithmetic, because the reduction modulo
f(t) is almost for free; this is the representation used in the AGM algorithm.
On the other hand, lifting f(t) in a careful way can give a representation in
which the Frobenius substitution is efficiently computable, the price to pay is a
dense polynomial f(t), hence a non-negligible reduction modulo f(t); this is the
representation used in the SST algorithm.
2.1 Notations in Zq
The ring Zq comes with the natural “reduction modulo 2” homomorphism onto
Fq. For x ∈ Zq, the notation x mod 2 means the element of Fq image of x by
this homomorphism. The ring Zq also comes with a valuation. Let x and y be
elements of Zq; the valuation of (x − y) is high when x and y are close to each
other. More precisely, the valuation of (x− y) is k if (x− y) is in 2kZq; then we
write x ≡ y mod 2kZq, or simply x ≡ y mod 2k.
In an algorithm, when we say “compute x := . . . mod 2k”, this means that
the expression for computing x involves quantities which are known to precisions
such that the result is known to precision at least k. The variable x is then
assigned an element which is congruent to the result modulo 2k.
We use the same notation σ for all kind of 2-nd power Frobenius action:
ring/field automorphisms of Fq and Zq, and also their coordinate-wise extensions
to isogenies from an elliptic curve to its conjugate. There should be no confusion,
because all the domain of these maps are distinct and all the reduction-diagrams
involving two of these σ commute.
2.2 Canonical Lift of an Elliptic Curve
It is easy to find many curves over Zq whose equations reduce to the equation
of E modulo 2. However, there is a canonical way to do it and keep information
on the group order.
Theorem 1 (Lubin–Serre–Tate). Let E be a non supersingular elliptic curve
over Fq. Then, up to isomorphism, there exists a unique curve E defined over
Zq, such that:
1. The equation of E reduces to the equation of E modulo 2;
2. End(E) ∼= End(E).
4A consequence of this theorem is the following commutative diagram
E σ−−−−→ Eσy
y
E
σ−−−−→ Eσ
where σ on the top arrow is the 2-nd power Frobenius isogeny from E to Eσ.
This isogeny being of degree 2, the modular equation of degree 2 relates the
j-invariants of the canonically lifted curves:
Φ2(j(E), j(Eσ)) = 0,
where Φ2(X,Y ) is the symmetric bivariate polynomial
X3 + Y 3 −X2Y 2 + 1488(XY 2 +X2Y )− 162000(X2 + Y 2)
+ 40773375XY + 8748000000(X + Y )− 157464000000000.
Notation: Let c be an element of Zq and let c be its reduction modulo 2. If c is
not the j-invariant of a supersingular curve, then we denote by c↑ the j-invariant
of the canonical lift of an elliptic curve whose invariant is c.
3 Satoh–Skjernaa–Taguchi Algorithm
We do not describe all the details of the SST algorithm: we concentrate on the
main two steps: firstly the j-invariant of the canonical lift of E is computed to
some precision, then the norm of a quantity is computed, yielding the trace. We
refer to the original paper [10] for a description of the missing steps.
3.1 Canonical Lifting of the j-Invariant
We are given j(E) in Fq \F4, and we want to compute j(E). The value of j(E) is
determined one bit after the other: assume that we know J such that J ≡ j(E)
mod 2k, then writing j(E) = J +2ke, and plugging it formally into the equation
Φ2(j(E), j(Eσ)) = 0, one gets an equation yielding e modulo 2. Hence we have
gained one bit on the approximation of j(E).
For a more precise setting, we take a Taylor expansion:
0 = Φ2(j(E), j(E)σ) = Φ2(J + 2ke, Jσ + 2keσ)
= Φ2(J, J
σ) + 2ke∂XΦ2(J, J
σ) + 2keσ∂Y Φ2(J, J
σ) + 22k−1(element of Zq).
In this equation, Φ2(J, J
σ) is zero modulo 2k, we can therefore divide every-
thing by 2k. Furthermore the Kronecker relation implies that ∂XΦ2(J, J
σ) is
zero modulo 2 and that ∂Y Φ2(J, J
σ) is different from zero modulo 2. Finally we
have eσ ≡ e2 mod 2 and we get
e2 ≡ Φ2(J, J
σ)
2k∂Y Φ2(J, Jσ)
mod 2.
5To turn this into an algorithm, we need to apply σ to elements of Zq. For this,
the polynomial defining Zq over Z2 is chosen such that its roots are (q − 1)-th
roots of unity. This polynomial is precomputed once for all, for each base field.
Hence Frobenius substitution is just reordering the coefficients and reducing
modulo the defining polynomial (see [9] for details).
Then we get the following first lifting algorithm: (inverse of Frobenius is used,
thus saving the computation of the square root of e in the previous formula)
Algorithm 1.
Input: j and a desired precision k.
Output: j↑ to precision k.
1. d := ∂Y Φ2(σ
−1(j), j);
2. y := j;
3. For i from 1 to k − 1 do
4. x := σ−1(y) mod 2i+i;
5. y := y − dΦ2(x, y) mod 2i+1;
6. Return y;
In a point counting context, we need k ≈ n2 . Running the i-th loop requires
1 Frobenius substitution and O(1) multiplications of elements of Zq at precision
2i+1. Therefore the cost of Algorithm 1 is in O(n1+2µ) bit-operations, which is
the cost of other lifting methods. Here µ is a real such that multiplication of k
bit objects can be done in time O(kµ).
When looking at what is going on in Step 5, we see that Φ2(x, y) is very close
to zero and only the small non-zero piece of information is used to update y. It
looks sub-optimal to recompute all the time Φ2(x, y) from scratch: the values of
x and y at step i + 1 are close to the ones at step i, therefore Φ2(x, y) at step
i + 1 can be deduced from its value at step i and some adjustment involving
partial derivatives. By precomputing the partial derivatives modulo 2W , one can
update Φ2(x, y) during W iterations, then one needs to recompute one time
Φ2(x, y) from scratch before doing again W iterations with only cheap updates.
These ideas yield the SST lifting algorithm, a sketch of which is reproduced in
Algorithm 2.
In [10] it is shown that Algorithm 2 runs in time O(n2µ+1/(µ+1)), when one
chooses W = nµ/(µ+1). Therefore, it is always better than Algorithm 1, because
µ > 1. If an FFT-based multiplication algorithm is used, µ = 1 + ε, and we get
a complexity of O(n2.5+ε).
From the lifted j, a quantity can be derived which is a rational fraction in j,
such that the norm of this quantity gives the trace of E.
6Algorithm 2. SST canonical lifting
Input: j and a desired precision k; a parameter W .
Output: j↑ to precision k.
1. y := j↑ mod 2W , computed via Algorithm 1;
2. DX := ∂XΦ2(σ
−1(y), y) mod 2W ;
DY := ∂Y Φ2(σ
−1(y), y) mod 2W ;
3. For m from 1 to bk−1W c do
4. Lift arbitrarily y modulo 2(m+1)W ;
5. V := Φ2(σ
−1(y), y) mod 2(m+1)W ;
6. For i from 0 to W − 1 do
7. Compute y := j↑ mod 2mW+i+1;
8. Update V := Φ2(σ
−1(y), y) mod 2mW+i+1;
// Steps (7) and (8) use only operations modulo 2W ;
9. Return y;
3.2 Fast Norm Computation
In [10] a fast norm computation is described, that is well-suited to the case of
point-counting in characteristic 2. It is based on the following equation:
Norm(x) = exp(Tr(log(x))),
which holds whenever log and exp converge. Computing a trace is far easier than
computing a norm, and the subsequent exponential is very cheap. Therefore the
main cost is a log evaluation, which is performed by fast evaluation of power
series. We refer to the original paper for details, and will not discuss this part
anymore, since the norm computation is a step which has to be done for any
variant of the algorithm, and it is not the place where one is better than the
other.
4 AGM Algorithm
We recall here the principles of the AGM algorithm. We give no proof of the
results, they can be derived in the same manner as for the other point-counting
algorithms and are out of the scope of this paper.
4.1 The Arithmetic-Geometric Mean (AGM) Sequence
Let a6 be an element of F
∗
q and let E be the curve of equation y
2 +xy = x3 + a6
with j-invariant j(E) = a6
−1. We denote also by a6 an arbitrary element of
Zq that reduces to a6 modulo 2. We then have recursive formulae which give a
well-defined sequence (Ai, Bi) of elements of Zq:
A0 = 1 + 8a6, B0 = 1,
7Ai+1 =
Ai +Bi
2
, Bi+1 =
√
AiBi,
where the square root is chosen to be congruent to 1 modulo 4. Indeed, by
induction, we show that if Ai ≡ Bi ≡ 1 mod 4 and AiBi = 1+8α for an invertible
α, then the squareroot is possible to be taken and if the one which is chosen is
congruent to 1 modulo 4, the same properties hold at step i+ 1.
This sequence (Ai, Bi) is called the AGM sequence and we can associate to
it the sequence of elliptic curves Ei of equations y
2 = x(x − A2i )(x − B2i ). We
denote by ji the j-invariant of the curve Ei.
4.2 Link with Canonical Lifting
It is well known that AGM is linked to isogenies of degree 2 between elliptic
curves. This in turn gives a link with the canonical lifting as follows:
Theorem 2. Let ji be the j-invariant of the curve Ei attached to the AGM
sequence. Then the sequence ji verifies:
j0 ≡ a−26 mod 2,
ji+1 ≡ j2i mod 2,
ji ≡ j↑i mod 2i+2.
The first assertion shows that E0 is isomorphic to the conjugate of a lift of
the initial curve E modulo 2. The second relation states that all the curves Ei
also reduce modulo 2 to conjugates of the curve E (up to isomorphism). The
third one is the heart of the AGM algorithm: it means that when progressing
along the AGM sequences, we get closer and closer to the canonical lift.
This yields immediately a straightforward algorithm for computing the canon-
ical lift. Starting with the initial values of (A0, B0), we apply the recursive for-
mula to compute successive values of (Ai, Bi). After k steps, we can compute
the j-invariant of the associated curve which is close to the canonical lifting of
a conjugate of E up to precision about 2k.
The link with the trace is given by the following result:
Theorem 3. Let i > 0 and let ci be NormZq/Zp
(
Ai+1
Ai
)
. Then
ci +
q
ci
≡ Tr(E) mod 2i+4.
A point-counting algorithm follows easily: one computes the AGM sequence
with enough steps, then a norm computation gives the trace of the initial curve
up to some precision which is equal to the number of steps plus a constant. A
practical complication arises: on a computer one cannot really deal with elements
of Zq, but with truncated ones. At first sight, it seems that we need a high
starting precision for A0 and B0, because we get less and less significant digits
on Ai and Bi when at the same time the ji gets closer to the canonical lift. This
8problem can be overturned by adding arbitrary noise to Ai and Bi just before
doing an operation which “looses” precision like a square root or a division by
2.
After having cleaned the details we get the following algorithm:
Algorithm 3. AGM point-counting
Input: a6 in F
∗
2n .
Output: Trace of the curve y2 + xy = x3 + a6.
1. a := 1 + 8a6 mod 16; b := 1 mod 16; k := 4;
2. Repeat until k = dn2 e+ 3:
3. Lift arbitrarily a and b modulo 2k+2;
4. (a, b) :=
(
a+b
2 mod 2
k+1,
√
ab mod 2k+1
)
;
5. k := k + 1;
6. a′ := a+b2 ;
7. Return Norm(a
′
a ) mod 2
dn
2
e+2 as a signed integer in
[−2√2n, 2√2n].
4.3 Runtime Analysis
The AGM algorithm requires O(n) operations between elements of Zq with max-
imal precision in O(n), and then a norm computation. As said before, the norm
computation will not be discussed here, because it is the same in every algorithm.
The cost of the lifting process is in O(n1+2µ), which is the same as Algorithm 1.
Hence Algorithm 2 by Satoh–Skjernaa–Taguchi is asymptotically faster than the
AGM for the lifting phase (but requires precomputation). However the AGM al-
gorithm has a very low constant, due to the small number of operations at each
step and the fact that a sparse defining polynomial for Zq can be used. The
figures given in [10] suggest that for cryptographical sizes, AGM remains faster.
5 AGM-Aided SST Algorithm
The AGM algorithm as stated before does not appear to be mixable with the
SST idea. Therefore, before doing so we need to rewrite it in a univariate way
to reveal the hidden modular equation which can then be used instead of Φ2 in
the SST algorithm. This is also this version of the AGM algorithm that we shall
use for the comparison and the implementation in the next sections. We do not
expect any speed difference between the univariate and the bivariate AGM.
5.1 Univariate AGM Algorithm
Taking again the AGM sequence as a starting point, we define a new sequence
λi =
Ai
Bi
.
9The corresponding curves have equation y2 = x(x− 1)(x−λ2i ). An easy compu-
tation shows that λi+1 can be computed directly from λi by
λi+1 =
1 + λi
2
√
λi
.
Another important fact is that λi+1 ≡ λσi mod 2i+4, which corresponds to the
fact that we are jumping from a curve to an approximation of its conjugate.
The corresponding univariate AGM algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 4. Univariate AGM
Input: a6 in F
∗
2n .
Output: Trace of the curve y2 + xy = x3 + a6.
1. λ := 1 + 8a6 mod 16; k := 4;
2. Repeat until k is dn3 e+ 3:
3. Lift arbitrarily λ modulo 2k+2;
4. λ := 1+λ
2
√
λ
mod 2k+1;
5. k := k + 1;
6. Return Norm( 2λ1+λ ) mod 2
dn
2
e+2 as a signed integer in
[−2√2n, 2√2n].
Implementation of the Square Root. The main step of this algorithm is
Step (4) in which we have to compute the inverse of the square root of λ and
to multiply the result by 1+λ2 . The inverse of the square root is computed via
a Newton iteration that can be done without inversion. First we note that λ is
always of the form λ ≡ 1+8α mod 16. Then 1√
λ
≡ 1−4α mod 8, and this will
be the initialization of the lift. Then the iteration is
xn+1 := xn +
xn
2
(1− λx2n).
If for some n, xn is congruent to
1√
λ
modulo 2k, then one can show that xn+1 is
equal to 1√
λ
modulo 22k−1 (see for instance Lemma 2.7 in [2]).
5.2 Modified Modular Equation
In the previous algorithm, the λi which is computed at the last step of the loop
is (the conjugate of) a solution of the following equations:
Z ≡ 1 + 8a6 mod 16,
(Zσ)2(1 + Z)2 − 4Z ≡ 0 mod 2i.
But this is precisely this kind of system that SST algorithm is meant to solve. It
remains to remove the leading non-significant bits in λi and to prove the same
result on partial derivatives that made Algorithm 1 work.
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Let E(X,Y ) be the AGM modular equation:
E(X,Y ) = Y 2(1 +X)2 − 4X = 0.
We make a change of variables X ← 1 + 8X, Y ← 1 + 8Y, and the modular
equation becomes:
E˜(X,Y ) = (X + 2Y + 8XY )2 + Y + 4XY = 0,
which has to be solved, subject to the conditions that X is known and non-zero
modulo 2 and Y = Xσ.
The partial derivative of E˜ evaluated at (X,Y ) give
∂XE˜(X,Y ) = 2(X + 2Y + 8XY )(1 + 8Y ) + 4Y
∂Y E˜(X,Y ) = (1 + 4X)(1 + 4(X + 2Y + 8XY ))
This proves that ∂XE˜(X,Y ) is congruent to 0 modulo 2, whereas ∂Y E˜(X,Y )
is 1 modulo 2, thus yielding the required asymmetry for the SST algorithm to
converge. Note also that the partial derivative with respect to Y is 1 modulo 2,
so that it is no longer necessary to compute d in Step (1) of Algorithm 1.
5.3 Modified Satoh–Skjernaa-Taguchi (MSST) Algorithm
According to the previous section, it is possible to use SST algorithm to compute
the lifted invariant of the curve (or more precisely some kind of Legendre’s
invariant of the canonical lift of the curve). It remains to compute the data whose
norm will give the result. This is actually much simpler than in the original SST
algorithm: transposing the results of the AGM method, we can see that if λ is a
solution of E˜(X,Xσ) and λ ≡ a6 mod 2 then the following holds:
Tr(E) ≡ Norm
(
1
1 + 4λ
)
mod 2n.
We obtain Algorithm 5.
The advantage of the MSST algorithm is 2-sided: firstly the modular equation
is smaller thus reducing by a constant factor the number of operations, secondly
the intermediate step between the lift and the norm does not exist any more,
thus simplifying the code and giving a slight speed-up.
6 Theoretical Comparison
The MSST algorithm is always faster than the plain SST algorithm because it
involves strictly less operations. It remains to compare it to the AGM algorithm.
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Algorithm 5. MSST point-counting
Input: a6 in F
×
2n .
Output: Trace of the curve y2 + xy = x3 + a6.
1. y := a6; // arbitrary lift to 2
W .
2. For i from 1 to W − 1 do
3. x := σ−1(y) mod 2i+i;
4. y := y − E˜(x, y) mod 2i+1;
5. x := σ−1(y) mod 2W ;
6. DX := ∂XE˜(x, y) mod 2
W ; DY := ∂Y E˜(x, y) mod 2
W ;
7. For m from 1 to d n2W e do
8. Lift arbitrarily y modulo 2(m+1)W ;
9. x := σ−1(y) mod 2(m+1)W ;
10. V := E˜(x, y) mod 2(m+1)W ;
11. For i from 0 to W − 1 do // break if i+mW ≥ dn2 e
12. ∆Y := −2−mWV mod 2W ;
13. ∆X := σ
−1(∆Y ) mod 2W ;
14. y := y + 2mW∆Y mod 2
(m+1)W ;
15. V := V + 2mW (DX∆X +DY ∆Y ) mod 2
(m+1)W ;
16. Return Norm( 11+4y ) mod 2
dn
2
e+2 as a signed integer in
[−2√2n, 2√2n].
6.1 Constraint Environments
In a constraint environment it might be preferable to choose an algorithm for
which no precomputation need to be stored and the RAM requirement stays low.
In this context, the AGM algorithm (with the norm computation replaced by
an extra loop) is by far the best choice. However, one should keep in mind that
for a reasonable key-size, the amount of precomputed data to be stored for the
SST algorithm is not so high: this is essentially two elements of Zq at maximal
precision; for instance, for F2163 , it is only a few kilo-bytes. This might be too
much for a smart card, but this is not a problem on a PDA.
We consider as unlikely that someone really wants to count points in a highly
constraint environment. Indeed, this kind of computation is required during the
setup of the system parameters and the result does not need at all to be secret.
Hence a card can ask to the server to do the computation if a new parameter
setting is required.
In the following, we shall therefore concentrate on the case where we have no
constraints and a machine word size of 32 bits (still the most common for PC’s).
6.2 Assumptions
We recall that we are interested in cryptographically useful sizes. In that case,
it has been shown in [10] that in the SST algorithm it is not worthwhile to use
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a W parameter different from the machine word size. Therefore we shall always
consider that W = 32 is the optimal parameter for the MSST algorithm.
Another assumption we make is that multiplying integers of size less than
the machine word size is not significantly faster than multiplying integers of size
exactly the machine word size. At first sight, this assumption looks reasonable
since the assembly instructions for multiplying bytes or short integers usually do
not require much less cycles than the instruction for long integers. In fact this
is a bit misleading because in both AGM and MSST algorithms several of these
operations are parallelizable, one could therefore pack several small integers in
a word size integer and perform several multiplication at once, or one could
also use specific multimedia instruction like the MMX or SSE2 instruction set
in the case of the Pentium. Using those could speed-up both the algorithms
and we shall consider that we do not penalize one or the other by always using
machine-word-size arithmetic.
6.3 Cost Analysis
In this section we compare the lifting parts of the AGM and the MSST algo-
rithm. In MSST, we use a dense defining polynomial for Zq in order to speed-up
the Frobenius substitution computation. Therefore the reduction modulo the
defining polynomial subsequent to a multiplication or a square is costly. On the
other hand, in the AGM we have no Frobenius substitution to perform and it is
possible to use a sparse defining polynomial, leading to an almost free reduction.
Therefore, reductions will be counted in the MSST algorithm whereas we shall
neglect them in the AGM. In MSST, with the dense polynomial, Frobenius sub-
stitution can be done at a cost of roughly one multiplication and one reduction,
as explained in [9]. We do not count additions and other simpler operations.
We use the following notations for the basic operations in Zq:
P : unreduced product
S : unreduced square
R : reduction modulo defining polynomial
Furthermore, we can add an index i to each of these symbols to indicate the
number of W-bit-digits of each operand.
MSST Algorithm The cost to evaluate the modular equation E˜ is P +S+2R.
Each of its partial derivatives can be evaluated at a cost of 2P + 2R, and if one
wants both derivatives, one can share the result of one product and get a cost
of 3P + 3R.
Steps (2)-(4) cost (W − 1)(2P1 + S1 + 3R1).
Steps (5)-(6) cost 4P1 + 4R1.
Next we analyze the cost of Steps (8)-(15) for each value of m:
Steps (9)-(10) cost 2Pm+1 + Sm+1 + 3Rm+1.
Steps (12)-(15) cost W (3P1 + 2R1). Indeed, the multiplications by powers of
2 are for free, and one reduction can be saved at step (15). Actually, as explained
in [10], some operations could be done on one bit operands.
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If we need to lift to precision k, the total cost of MSST is then
(3k−W+2)P1+(2k+W+1)R1+(W−1)S1+
∑
1≤m≤d k−W
W
e
(2Pm+1+Sm+1+3Rm+1).
We then apply this formula with W = 32, for two base fields.
For F2163 , we need a precision k = 82, and we get
CMSST (163) = 216P1 + 31S1 + 197R1 + 2P2 + S2 + 3R2 + 2P3 + S3 + 3R3.
For F2239 , we need a precision k = 120, and we get
CMSST (239) = 330P1 + 31S1 + 273R1 + 2P2 + S2 + 3R2 + 2P3 + S3 + 3R3
+2P4 + S4 +R4.
Hence we readily notice that for cryptographical sizes, only few operations
require multiprecision arithmetic.
AGM Algorithm As said above, we study the univariate AGM instead of the
bivariate one. The key step is then clearly Step (4), and in this step the crucial
part is the Newton iteration for computing the inverse of
√
λ:
xn+1 := xn +
xn
2
(1− λx2n).
As usual for a Newton iteration, we need to have operations with variable
precision. If we want to compute xn+1 with precision k from xn known at preci-
sion roughly k/2, at first sight it requires one square and two products computed
modulo 2k. However this can be improved: (1 − λx2n) is zero at precision k/2,
because xn is already a good approximation of the result. Hence when we mul-
tiply this further by xn, this is actually a multiplication at precision k/2 that
has to be performed. One step further is explained by Karp and Markstein in
[6]: the “self-correctingness” of this iteration allows to compute λx2n with two
multiplications of an operand at precision k and the other at precision k/2.
We note however that in our case a square ideally costs roughly one half of
a product and that this “Full times Half” precision product saves one fourth of
the operations. Thus the trick of Karp and Markstein does not help in our case.
Estimating the number of operations in a Newton iteration is not that easy,
due to the variable precision. To simplify the formulae we shall consider that the
precision is exactly doubled at each step (whereas in fact one bit is lost). On the
other hand this is easy to write a short program that emulate the algorithm and
count the number of operations and the precision required, because there is no
branching depending on the input data. Hence for a given base field, it is much
simpler to run this emulation to evaluate the cost. We shall compare the results
given by both approaches.
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Cost of one lift in single precision. The cost of the Newton iteration to get
the inverse of the square root at a precision between 2k−1 and 2k < W is
(k − 1)(2P1 + S1). After the lift one has to multiply the result by 1+λ2 , which
cost another P1.
Cost of the first W iterations. We split the interval [0,W ] into pieces where
the cost of the iterations are the same, and add them all. We get the following
formula for the cost:
∑
2≤k≤log2(W )
(k − 1)2k−1(2P1 + S1) +WP1,
which simplifies to
(2 +W (log2(W )− 2)) (2P1 + S1) +WP1.
Cost of the W iterations between precision W and 2W . The last step in a Newton
iteration is done at precision of twoW -bit digits and all the others are at precision
1. Furthermore, for each lift, the number of iteration at precision 1 is always
(log2(W )− 1)(2P1 + S1). Hence the cost of all the second W operations is
W
(
(log2(W )− 1)(2P1 + S1) + P1 + 2P2 + S2
)
.
In this formula, we took into account the fact that in the last iteration at preci-
sion 2, one operation has only to be done at precision 1.
Cost of the W iterations between precision 2W and 3W . The last step in a
Newton lift is done at a precision of 3 digits, thus reducing to compute the
result at a precision between W and 1.5W . The penultimate step is therefore
at a precision of 2 digits, and the remaining steps are done at precision 1. The
overall cost is then
W
(
(log2(W )− 1)(2P1 + S1) + P1 + 2P2 + S2 + 2P3 + S3
)
.
Cost of the W iterations between precision 3W and 4W . The last step in a
Newton lift is done at a precision of 4 digits, and the penultimate is done at a
precision of 2 digits. The others steps are done at precision 1. Hence the following
overall cost:
W
(
(log2(W )− 1)(2P1 + S1) + P1 + 2P2 + S2 + 2P4 + S4
)
.
Cost of one iteration at a precision of k digits. The Newton iteration starts as
always by (log2(W ) − 1) operations at a precision of 1 digit. Then there are
O(log2(k)) operations at a precision of at most k digits. Including the cost of
the multiplication by 1+λ2 , there is at least 2Pk + Sk.
We apply now our analysis to the same cases than for the MSST algorithm,
namely n = 163 and n = 239, with W = 32.
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We get
CAGM,th(163) = 696P1 + 306S1 + 104P2 + 52S2 + 40P3 + 20S3,
and
CAGM,th(239) = 1038P1 + 458S1 + 180P2 + 90S2 + 64P3 + 32S3 + 52P4 + 26S4.
With the emulation program mentioned above we get:
CAGM,emu(163) = 694P1 + 303S1 + 109P2 + 57S2 + 45P3 + 23S3,
and
CAGM,emu(239) = 1033P1 +452S1 +188P2 +98S2 +64P3 +32S3 +57P4 +29S4.
These values are close enough to justify the simplifications we made in our
analysis.
6.4 Comparison
We first compare the cost of the lifting up to precision W = 32, where all the
operations that take place are single precision. We have to compare
62P1 + 31S1 + 93R1 and 228P1 + 98S1.
This clearly depends on the relative costs of R1 and P1. It is always possible
to do a reduction at the cost of two products, once a small precomputation is
done (see [14], page 247). Hence R1 ≤ 2P1. Note that in our implementation
(see below) we got a ratio close to 1.5. Also S1 is usually about 1.5 faster than
P1. With these ratios, the advantage is on MSST side.
Next, we compare the costs for gaining W bits of precision at a higher level.
This corresponds to one iteration of Steps (8)-(15) in MSST or W loops of AGM.
Let k be the number of digits corresponding to the precision. In MSST, the cost
is
2Pk + Sk + 3Rk + 96P1 + 64R1,
whereas in AGM we have
64Pk + 32Sk + · · ·+ 256P1 + 128S1,
where the dots contain operations at a precision strictly between 1 and k digits.
Hence MSST is clearly faster than than AGM, and the difference increases
with the size of the basefield, due to the higher number of operations at multi-
precision in AGM.
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7 Practical Experiments
We implemented the MSST and the univariate AGM algorithm in the C pro-
gramming language, using the GNU MP library [4] for the low-level integer mul-
tiplications. Multiplications in Zq are done via Karatsuba algorithm. We wrote
specific code for the machine word-size precision because in that case many
things are simplified and this is critical in both algorithms. We give timings for
two field sizes: n = 163 and n = 239. All the experiments are made on a Pentium
III at 700 MHz running Linux. The compiler is gcc version 2.96.
Field size Precision Product Square Reduction
163 1 word 0.11 ms 0.07 ms 0.14 ms
2 words 1.4 ms 0.92 ms 2.3 ms
3 words 1.8 ms 1.3 ms 3.6 ms
239 1 word 0.21 ms 0.13 ms 0.29 ms
2 words 2.5 ms 1.7 ms 4.9 ms
3 words 3.4 ms 2.3 ms 6.8 ms
4 words 5.4 ms 4.5 ms 10.8 ms
Field size Lift MSST Lift AGM Norm computation Total MSST Total AGM
163 0.08 s 0.49 s 0.05 s 0.13 s 0.54 s
239 0.26 s 1.82 s 0.14 s 0.40 s 1.96 s
We see that at low precision, we were able to get a reduction step faster than
two times a product. For the two given field sizes, the ratio between the two lifted
methods is a factor of 6 to 7 in favor of the MSST algorithm. We implemented the
norm computation to get significant runtimes for the complete point-counting
computation. However this part is not as well optimized as the first step and
the runtime we give might be improved. We only mention that in case of MSST
algorithm, after the lift, we switch to the sparse representation before calling the
same norm routine as the one used for AGM. This base conversion can be made
very quick by precomputing the corresponding matrix. For cryptographical sizes,
this matrix fits easily in a few mega-bytes, but for records, this strategy is not
feasible. For the complete computation, the overall gain we have by choosing
MSST instead of AGM is respectively by a factor of 4.15 and 4.90 for fields of
163 and 239 bits.
For comparison, we recall that the runtimes given in [10] for the original SST
algorithm were 0.76s for a field of 163 bits and 2.54s for 239 bits on a 866 MHz
Pentium III.
8 Conclusion
We presented a modification of the SST algorithm, using ideas taken from the
AGM algorithm to speed-up the lifting phase and remove the second phase; the
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norm computation is unchanged. We did a precise theoretical and experimental
comparison between our method and the AGM. We demonstrate that the number
of operations is much smaller for the former. To illustrate this we implemented
both methods with the same level of optimization — actually, they use the same
time-critical functions. The gain is significant, even for small cryptographical
field sizes.
For cryptographical applications, it is required to have an almost prime group
order. Therefore it is usually necessary to count O(log(n)) curves before finding
one suitable for cryptography. To speed-up this search, in [3] the authors propose
to mix the p-adic point-counting method with an early-abort strategy a` la Schoof.
Indeed for a small prime `, it is possible to decide quickly whether the group
order is divisible by `, and if so to switch to another curve without running
the p-adic algorithm. The size of the largest ` for which we do this depends on
the relative costs of the point-counting algorithm and the early-abort. Since [3],
the cost of point-counting has been greatly reduced, and the number of ` to
consider must have diminished accordingly. Therefore it would be nice to also
have new ideas in the early-abort stage to obtain another speed-up in the curve
construction.
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